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Abstract: South Africa experienced substantial rises in the ratios of consumption and household debt 
to income from 1983, for which conventional explanations in terms of income, income expectations, 
interest rates and wealth prove inadequate. This paper emphasizes the role of substantial financial 
liberalization, which is of interest for two reasons. The first is to help understand South Africa’s low 
saving rate, an endemic problem. The second is that unlike the UK, Scandinavia, Mexico and other 
countries, South Africa’s financial liberalization occurred without an asset price boom, thus 
illuminating the direct role of financial liberalization. Previous attempts to model financial 
liberalization are not fully satisfactory. Our methodological innovation is to treat financial 
liberalization as an unobservable, proxied by a spline function, and entering both consumption and 
debt equations, which are jointly estimated. We also clarify the multi-faceted effects of financial 
liberalization on consumption. The comprehensive solved-out consumption function uses our own 
constructed set of personal wealth estimates at market value and income forecasts from a forecasting 
equation (allowing underlying macro-fundamentals to enter the model). The empirical results 
corroborate the theory in the paper, confirming the importance for consumer spending of extensive 
financial liberalization, of fluctuations in a range of asset values and asset accumulation, and of 
income expectations. Results suggest that households largely pierce the corporate veil. The paper also 
throws important light on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in South Africa.  
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1. Introduction 
             
Although the implications of financial liberalization have aroused interest, controversy, and a 
growing literature (such as Bayoumi 1993a, 1993b; Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven 1997; 
Bandiera et al 2000; Honohan 1999), there has not been an entirely satisfactory applied 
analysis of these implications in the consumption literature. One major difficulty has been to 
find an indicator of credit market deregulation with which to model the direct and interaction 
effects of financial liberalization.  
  We distinguish three facets of financial liberalization, which the previous literature 
does not bring out clearly. Financial liberalization reduces credit constraints on households 
engaging in smoothing consumption when they expect income growth; reduces deposits 
required of first-time buyers of housing; and increases the availability of collateral-backed 
loans for households which already possess collateral. Financial liberalization makes possible 
greater borrowing, and this can give rise to asset booms, which make further borrowing and 
spending possible. The consumption to income ratio can rise sharply, as seen in the U.K. and 
Scandinavia in the 1980s, and Mexico in the 1990s. In this paper, we introduce several 
methodological innovations in the measurement of the effect of financial liberalization on 
consumption, and apply these to South African data. 
Since the early 1980s, South Africa has experienced substantial rises in the ratios to 
income of consumption and household debt (Figure 1). Conventional explanations in terms of 
income, income expectations, interest rates and wealth prove inadequate. This paper argues 
that South Africa’s extensive financial liberalization is an essential part of the explanation, 
and is particularly interesting for two reasons. 
First, low saving rates, especially in the personal and government sectors, are the 
symptom of a persistent structural weakness in South Africa (see Aron and Muellbauer, 
2000), which in the 1990s has been reflected in high real interest rates and dependence on 
capital inflows. Second, in South Africa, unlike in the U.K., Scandinavia, Mexico and other 
countries, real house prices have declined almost continuously (from 1984), despite the 
process of financial liberalization. This makes it easier to identify the direct effects of 
financial liberalization on consumption, disguised in other countries by the correlation with 
asset prices. 
The most comprehensive South African consumption function to date comes from the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) model (Pretorius and Knox, 1995), where an error 
correction approach is employed to model separately the four components of consumption, 
durables, semi-durables, non-durables and services. Absent from this model are relative 
prices, assets and debt, proxies for expectations and measures of financial liberalization. 
These are important omissions. Fluctuations in asset prices and changes in financial 
liberalization can lead to huge forecasting errors when these variables are absent (Muellbauer 
and Lattimore, 1995). The omission of asset stock variables is not surprising since the SARB 
does not construct these measures, but this makes it impossible to test rigorously whether 
households “pierce the corporate veil”. 
Our paper remedies most of these problems in estimating quarterly personal 
consumption models for South Africa of the solved-out type (as opposed to the Euler 
equation form). An important innovation in this paper is to treat financial liberalization as an 
unobservable indicator entering both consumption and debt equations. This indicator is 
proxied by a linear spline function and the parameters are estimated, subject to cross-equation 
restrictions, from a joint estimation of the household consumption and debt equations. Indeed 
we find evidence that both the consumption function and debt equation are subject to major 
structural breaks when allowance is not made for financial liberalization.    2 
In contrast, most econometric models (e.g. Bank of England, 1999; Brodin and 
Nymoen, 1992)  do not attempt to distinguish the direct effects of financial liberalization on 
consumption from wealth effects. This can lead to exaggeratedly large estimates of, for 
example, housing wealth effects on consumption, and subsequent model failure.  
  Further, while consumption theory puts great weight on income expectations, 
expectations are hardly ever treated empirically in modelling consumption functions of the 
solved-out form. We generate income forecasts from a separate income-forecasting model 
(including equity prices, interest rates, capacity utilisation, and government budget surpluses 
as regressors), which will also capture shifts, for instance, in monetary policy. This model 
generates linkages between personal sector and government sector saving rates, missing in 
previous work. By incorporating important regime shifts in the economy, the resulting 
consumption function should be fairly immune from the Lucas critique. 
Finally, although there is a theory on asset liquidity and illiquidity, assets are 
frequently neglected in consumption modelling, or else are treated somewhat cavalierly, by 
adding up all assets as if they had equal “spendability”. We have elsewhere constructed 
wealth estimates on a market value basis, in what appears to be the first systematic attempt to 
construct such figures for South Africa (Muellbauer and Aron, 1999). Wealth is 
disaggregated into liquid and illiquid wealth measures, and the reweighted components of 
personal sector wealth and debt variables are used in our models: gross liquid assets, personal 
sector debt, and financial and physical illiquid assets. 
          Our  research  also  throws  light  on  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  in  South 
Africa, highlighting some of the policy dilemmas faced by the Reserve Bank.  The main three 
transmission channels are, first, the direct effect of interest rates on consumption, given 
income, income expectations and assets; secondly, the indirect effects via income and income 
expectations; and finally, indirect effects via asset prices. We quantify the first two of these, 
and part of the third, through our estimated asset effects. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical Foundations of the Consumption Function 
 
Since the seminal paper of Hall (1978), the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) for an 
infinitely-lived representative agent endowed with rational expectations (RE) has exerted a 
powerful influence on empirical work on consumption.  Under a number of simplifying 
assumptions Hall derived a martingale property for the intertemporal efficiency condition on 
consumption, or the Euler equation: 
 
  t t t c c ε + = −1  (2.1) 
 
where εt is a stochastic variable, unpredictable from information dated t-1, capturing news 
about permanent income. Note that equation (2.1) embodies the extreme consumption 
smoothing implication of the PIH, since at t-1, the consumer plans future consumption levels 
to be the same as the current level. 
  Solving this efficiency condition and its equivalents for all future periods gives the 








t y is expected permanent non-property income, r is the real rate of return, and  1 − t A is 
the real asset stock at the end of the previous period.   3 
  Making explicit and generalising all the assumptions leading to equations (2.1) and 
(2.2) essentially defines much of the consumption research agenda of the last 20 years.  These 
assumptions can be summarized as follows
1: 
 
(i)  It is assumed there are no credit restrictions, no other non-linearities in the budget 
constraint, and no “worst-case” scenarios, such as where income shrinks to zero.   
Concern with these issues has spawned a large literature on credit restrictions, capital 
market imperfections and the buffer-stock motive for saving.
2  
(ii)  A quadratic utility function is assumed so that equation (2.1) is linear, implying the 
irrelevance of income uncertainty - given assumption (i) above, and exact aggregation 
across households with identical preferences.
3   
(iii)  Additive preferences are assumed both across time and with separability between 
consumption and leisure.
4 
(iv)  Consumption is assumed measured by expenditure on non-durables or services and by 
the flow of services from durables not subject to transactions costs. 
(v)  The market real interest rate is assumed constant and to be the same as the subjective 
discount rate, which, in turn, is the same across all consumers.  If the real interest rate 
is stochastic, real interest rate expectations enter the Euler equation, interacting with 
consumption, which leads to the consumption capital asset pricing model, see 
Breedon (1979) and Campbell (1999).
5 
(vi)  Consumers are assumed to hold rational expectations.
6   
                                                 
1 This outline broadly follows Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995). Deaton (1992) contains an excellent 
discussion of many of these points. 
2  See Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), Deaton (1991, 1992) and Carroll (1992, 1997).  Such 
issues are widely believed to be a major reason for the ‘excess sensitivity’ of consumption changes to 
predictable income changes in aggregate data, contradicting equation (2.1).  Even if the consumer 
faces no short-term credit restrictions, but is merely constrained to have non-negative net assets at the 
end of life with probability 1, this can be sufficient to violate equations (2.1) and (2.2).  Under income 
uncertainty, the “worst-case” scenario about future incomes can then constrain current consumption 
below the level implied by equation (2.2), particularly if survival puts a lower floor on consumption.  
As this literature indicates, there are no closed-form mathematical representations of buffer-stock 
saving behaviour, though various approximations are possible. 
3  Concern with the precautionary saving motive has also led to a large literature (e.g. Skinner, 1988; 
Zeldes, 1989; and Kimball, 1990).  Income uncertainty then enters the Euler equation where higher 
uncertainty at t-1 about future income lowers consumption at t-1, and, ceteris paribus, raises ∆ct.  As 
far as the solved-out consumption function is concerned, even excluding violations of assumption (i) 
above, analytical representations of the effect of income uncertainty on consumption have been 
obtained only in the not altogether plausible case of exponential preferences.  More generally, the 
non-linearity of the Euler equation necessitates approximations both in aggregating micro-behaviour 
and in deriving the solved-out consumption function (and at both the micro- and the aggregate data 
levels). 
4  This is necessary to get the clean form of equation (2.1), without further lags in consumption 
entering, or such as arise in habit models, or variations in leisure influencing intertemporal 
substitution in consumption.  Models with habit formation have become an important research topic, 
see Hayashi (1985), Muellbauer (1988) and Constantinides (1990). 
5  This implies a set of relationships among asset returns assuming no transaction costs or trading 
restrictions in the set of assets under consideration, i.e. largely assuming away the phenomenon of 
“illiquidity”. 
6  If this is violated, the martingale property of equation (2.1), and of its extensions to Euler equations 
with stochastic interest rates and uncertainty, would cease to hold.  Though it would be foolish to 
assume that consumers, particularly the more affluent and better educated, do not use information 
about their private circumstances and the economy to predict future circumstances, RE remains an   4 
(vii)  Consumers are assumed infinitely-lived, or to have Barro (1974)-style dynastic 
features, which makes their behaviour similar to those of infinitely-lived consumers.
7   
 
Much research, not only that summarised above, suggests that the representative consumer 
REPIH model should not be regarded as an adequate approximation to behaviour. For 
instance, cross-sectional surveys suggest that consumption follows income more closely over 
the life-cycle than can be explained by the variation of need with age, e.g. due to the arrival 
and departure of children from the household (Deaton, 1992).  Attanasio (1999), however, 
disagrees with Deaton on this issue.  
  Further, although the Euler and solved-out consumption functions in the canonical 
REPIH model are theoretically equivalent, empirical versions of equations (2.1) and (2.2) are 
no longer equivalent or equally useful for at least four reasons.  First, it should be obvious 
that an explicit income-generating mechanism is needed to estimate equation (2.2). 
Therefore, the empirical solved-out consumption model is at least a two-equation model to 
generate income forecasts as well as consumption.  Secondly, incorporating some of the 
generalizations (i) to (vii) above, which entails considerable approximations, means that the 
generalized equations (2.1) and (2.2) will be different approximations to the underlying 
theoretical relationships, as well as weakening claims for the theoretical consistency of the 
Euler equation.
8 
  Thirdly, the solved-out consumption function does not throw away long-run 
information in the data on consumption, income and assets.  The literature on ‘equilibrium 
correction models’ and cointegration, (e.g. Davidson et al, 1978; Engle and Granger, 1987; 
and Banerjee et al, 1993) emphasizes the importance of extracting long-range information.  
In the Euler approach, the asset data are not used at all; and, by differencing, consumption 
and income, which are typically non-stationary, are reduced to stationarity. 
  Fourthly, the solved-out approach is directly relevant for policy analysis. For instance, 
the effects of a tax reform (which would alter the profile of future household income) could 
be analysed via the income-forecasting model incorporated in the solved-out approach.   
  The approximations needed to obtain policy-relevant consumption functions of the 
type described in the next section are no more extreme than those popularly made in the Euler 
equation context to incorporate credit constraints or myopia, by, for example, Hall and 
Mishkin (1982), Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), and many others.  Indeed, we argue 
that the traditional approximations are quite limited. In our more general solved-out 
consumption models, we also include the possibility that not all households have rational 
expectations and build in parameter shifts due to financial deregulation.  Furthermore, the 
Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976, 1981) is addressed directly, by building an income-forecasting 
model which recognizes the importance of policy feed-back rules and is sensitive to possible 






                                                                                                                                                        
extreme assumption.  Cochrane (1989) has shown that the utility gains from optimal intertemporal 
consumption choices are low compared with simple alternative rule of thumb behaviour.  With forces 
of natural selection less powerful for consumers than for firms operating in a competitive 
environment, arguably many households would adopt rules of thumb under normal circumstances. 
7  See Gali (1990, 1991) and Clarida (1991) for consequences of finite lives. 
8  Transitory consumption and time-aggregation raise additional problems in Euler equation 
estimation, though they can be satisfactorily dealt with using appropriately-dated instruments.   5 
2.1  Derivation of a Solved-Out Consumption Function 
 
(a)  A model for credit-unconstrained households. 
 
At the individual level, a solved-out consumption function is the solution to an intertemporal 
utility-maximizing problem, the case of the canonical REPIH, equation (2.2), being the 
classic example.  To log-linearize equation (2.2), note that 
 
 1 ) / ) ( / / / / 1 1 + − + = + = − − t t
P
t t t t
P
t t t t t y y y y rA y y y rA y c  (2.3) 
 
Noting that  x x ≅ + ) 1 log( , when x is small, and that  t t y rA / 1 −  is small for most consumers, 




t y y y y y ≅ − , 
 
 ) / log( / log log 1 t
P
t t t t t y y y rA y c + + = −  (2.4) 
 
Introducing habits or adjustment costs implies a partial adjustment form of equation (2.4), see 
Muellbauer (1988). 
Further, extending the model from static to probabilistic income expectations, 
introduces a measure of income uncertainty, θt  , as well as expected income growth, 
measured by  1 log + ∆ t t ym E , where  1 log + ∆ t ym  is defined as a weighted moving average of 
forward-looking growth rates. If real interest rates are variable, theory suggests the real 
interest rate rt enters the model. Incorporating these three additional variables, and partial 
adjustment, a simple linearization gives the following generalisation of the canonical REPIH 
model equation (2.2): 
 
  01 2 3 1 1 1 log ( log log / log ) tt t t t t t t t t cry E y m A y c β αα α θ α γ ε +− − ∆≈− − ++ ∆ + − +          (2.5) 
 
where β measures the speed of adjustment. In principle, α3 and γ should also depend upon θt 
and rt , since discount factors applied to expected incomes increase with income uncertainty 
and real interest rates.  We will suppress this complication for simplicity. 
  In practice, there are a number of reasons why income growth expectations embodied 
in  1 log + ∆ t t ym E  are likely to reflect a limited horizon. Under income uncertainty, 
precautionary behaviour is approximately equivalent to discounting future income by the real 
interest rate and an uncertainty premium (see Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995, p.250).  With 
anticipated credit constraints, under buffer-stock saving theory (see Deaton 1991, 1992), a 
further shortening of horizons is suggested.
9  Finally, with aggregate data it is hard to forecast 
income beyond about 3 years. Indeed, widely used time series models lose almost all their 
forecasting power even sooner, see Muellbauer (1996).  This suggests that the log of income 







                                                 
9  Incidentally, Friedman (1957, 1963) himself suggests a practical horizon of about 3 years.   6 
(b) Aggregating credit-constrained and unconstrained consumption using conventional 
assumptions. 
 
Equation (2.5) refers to the behaviour of forward-looking households who do not face credit 
constraints. We now outline the implications of the conventional method of introducing credit 
constraints. Assuming that πt is the consumption share of credit-constrained households, 









t c  is the consumption of the credit-constrained and 
u
t c  that of the credit-unconstrained. 
In the Euler equation literature, a widespread assumption is that for the credit-constrained, 
consumption equals non-property income (see Hall and Mishkin, and Campbell and Mankiw, 






t y c log log =  (2.7) 
 
To derive the form of the aggregate consumption function, we can define φ1t as the deviation 
of the log of average income of credit-unconstrained households from average log income, 
and φ2t as the corresponding deviation for credit-constrained households. 
  
  1 log log
u
tt t yy φ =+    (2.8) 
and 
  2 log log
c
tt t yy φ =+    (2.9) 
 
One expects φ1t > 0 and φ2t < 0, since credit-constrained households, on average, are likely to 
have lower incomes. We now make the simplifying assumption that φ1t and φ2t evolve slowly, 
so that  t
c
t y y log log ∆ ≈ ∆ . 
  By definition, if 
y
t π is the income share of credit-constrained households, 
 
  12 (1 ) 0
yy
tt t t πφ π φ −+ ≈  (2.10) 
 
since log (1 )log log .
yu y c
tt t t t yy y ππ ≈− +  
  It follows that 
 
   12 // ( 1 )
yy
tt t t φφ ππ =− −  (2.11) 
 
This expression implies that  1t φ and  2t φ are, respectively, proportional to 
y
t π and (1 )
y
t π −− , 
with the factor of proportionality depending, among other things, on 
y
t π  and the shape of the 
income distribution. Note that the consumption share, πt , and the income share,
u
t π , of credit-
constrained households do not coincide, though they should be highly correlated over time. 






t t t c c c log log ) 1 ( log ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ π π  (2.12)   7 
 
Consumption growth for those unconstrained by credit, 
u
t c log ∆ , can be expressed by 
rewriting equation (2.5) as 
 
  11 log ( ) log / log
uu u u u
tt t t t t t cf xy A y c βγ ε −−  ∆= ++ − +   (2.13) 
 
where 1 3 2 1 1 0 log ) ( + ∆ + − − = t t t t t ym E r x f α θ α α α . 
  For the credit-constrained, the consumption growth, 
u
t c log ∆ , is 
 
 log log .
c
tt cy ∆≈ ∆  (2.14) 
 
From equation (2.6), the expression  11 1 2 1 11 log [log ( log )]/(1 )
u
tt t t tt cc y πφ π −− − − −− ≅− + −  can be 
substituted into equation (2.13). The result further simplifies by using the assumption that πt 
as well as φ1t and φ2t evolve only slowly, so that  1 tt ππ − ≈ and  21 2 tt φφ − ≈ . Thus, substituting 
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t u
tt t t t t t t t t t cf x A e y y c
φ βπ π φ π φ γ −−  ∆≈− + −++ +−   
         (1 ) log (1 ) tt t t y β ππ ε +− ∆ +−  (2.15) 
 
Note that the asset holdings of unconstrained households will equal the average per capita 
asset level, if credit-constrained households hold no assets i.e.  11 (1 )
u




(c) A critique 
 
Most of the literature conceives of the effect of financial liberalization as a reduction in πt. 
We now ask what effect this limited conception of financial liberalization has on the long-run 
solution for consumption in this model. The model has quite restrictive implications.  The 
effect of a reduction in πt depends on three components in equation (2.15).   
  The first component is the term (1 ) ( ) tt fx π − : as πt falls, this term falls too, provided 
that 0 ) ( < t x f . There are good reasons why ) ( t x f should be negative. The long-run solution 
from equation (2.13) is log log ( ) /
uu u u cy f x A y γ =+ + . This can be thought of as an 
extension of the canonical REPIH (equation (2.2)) - which assumes certainty equivalence - to 
incorporate the effects of income uncertainty and variable real interest rates via the term, 
) ( t x f . Uncertainty reduces consumption for given income and assets, hence ) ( t x f is negative 
(indeed our later empirical evidence supports this).  
  The second component in equation (2.15) is the term  
 
  12 (1 ) tt t t π φ π φ −+  (2.16) 
 
Subtracting equation (2.10) from equation (2.16) yields 
 
  () () 12 1 2 (1 )
y
tt t t t t t t π φ π φ ππ φφ −+ = − −  (2.17)   8 
 
Note that  12 0 tt φφ −> .    But the income share of credit-constrained households is likely to 
exceed the consumption share. Credit unconstrained households can spend more than this 
level of income, as a result of their holding assets. Thus, it is likely that  0
y
tt ππ −> , and 
hence 12 () () 0
y
tt tt ππ φφ −− > . Furthermore, as πt falls, so  12 tt φφ − must fall, while the 
difference, 
y
tt ππ − , is also likely to narrow. Thus, the second component of equation (2.15) 
is likely to fall with πt. 





φ γ − , is the only 
component which unambiguously increases as πt falls, since φ1t falls with πt. 
  To summarize, a major restriction of the model in equation (2.15) is that it cannot 
generate a direct positive effect of financial liberalization on log(c/y). The only way a long-
run rise in log(c/y) can occur is through an increase in the coefficient on the asset-to-income 
ratio.
10 Another serious restriction is that equation (2.15) implies a counter-intuitive result for 
an important interactive effect: namely, that financial liberalization actually increases the 
negative effect of income uncertainty on consumption via the  ) ( ) 1 ( t t x f π −  term.   
  Unfortunately, much of the consumption literature that tries to incorporate financial 
liberalization is based on this theoretical model with its unappealing results. Moreover, the 
fact that πt depends not only on the institutional credit regime, but also on the level of real 
interest rates, is typically neglected in the literature. Many more households would like to 
borrow when real interest rates are negative, and will feel credit-constrained when they 
cannot. Conversely, when real interest rates are high many fewer households will want to 
borrow in the first place, and so fewer will be credit-constrained. 
 
(d) A more general treatment of the consequences of financial liberalization 
 
Clearly, the approach we have above outlined to modelling the behavioural implications of 
relaxing credit constraints suffers from major defects. Perhaps the most important of these is 
the failure to distinguish among the three types of credit constraints which are important in 
practice. The first constraint falls on households desiring to smooth consumption over time, 
when they expect their future income to be higher. This type of constraint is relaxed by 
greater competition in consumer credit markets, higher borrowing limits on credit cards and 
bank loans and access to multiple credit cards. Deaton (1991, 1992) challenges the 
assumption made by Hall and Mishkin (1982), and by Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), 
that those credit-constrained in this way simply spend their income. In Deaton’s model, many 
of the credit-constrained save to build up a small buffer stock of liquid assets to guard against 
the next downturn in income and the consequent loss of utility if the household relied only on 
its current income. The greater the income uncertainty, and the more severe the credit 
constraints, the greater will be this buffer-stock saving motive. Therefore, on average for the 





t y c log log < . A reduction in the severity of credit constraints narrows this 
difference, and moreover, reduces the negative effect of income uncertainty on consumption. 
Note also that Deaton’s analysis implies that the sharp distinction between the behaviour of 
the unconstrained in equation (2.5), and the constrained in equation (2.7), is invalid. In 
particular, as the buffer-stock asset holdings of the credit-constrained increase, their 
behaviour approximates that of equation (2.5) more closely. 
                                                 
10  Note, however, that the income growth expectations component of (1-πt)f(xt) can also generate a 
rise when these expectations are positive.    9 
  The second type of credit constraint to be distinguished has been emphasized by 
Jappelli and Pagano (1994). It concerns potential first-time buyers in the housing market.  A 
major motive to borrow is not to finance non-durable consumption but to acquire owner-
occupied housing.  Suppliers of mortgage credit apply rules setting upper limits to loan-to-
income and loan-to-value ratios to reduce default risk.  Young credit-constrained households 
then have to save to build up the minimum deposits required to get onto the owner-occupied 
housing ladder.
11  Once again such households will consume less than income, the difference 
depending on the ratio of house prices to income and on the minimum deposit as a fraction of 
the value of the house.  A reduction in credit constraints in the form of a reduction in the 
minimum deposit as a fraction of the value of the house, will raise the consumption of these 
households relative to income. 
  Most of these potential first-time buyers of housing are not credit-constrained in the 
sense of the first constraint discussed above. The savings they are building up for a future 
housing deposit can, meanwhile, be run down or increased in anticipation of shorter-term 
income fluctuations and in response to changes in real interest rates.  Their behaviour is thus 
better approximated by equation (2.5), but with an explicit direct positive effect of financial 
liberalization on consumption. 
  Finally, a third type of credit restriction should be distinguished, which concerns the 
use of collateral, whether housing or pensions, by those who already own collateral. In a 
number of countries, the relaxation of rules and spread of competition has made it easier to 
obtain loans backed by housing-equity (see Poterba and Manchester, 1989).  A rise in house 
prices then makes it possible to increase debt or to refinance other debt at the lower interest 
rates made possible by collateral backing.  Effectively, such liberalization of credit conditions 
increases the “spendability” or liquidity of previously more illiquid housing wealth.  In most 
countries, however, direct access to pension assets as loan collateral is not possible.  
  Taking these different considerations together, it is clear that the aggregate 
consumption function represented in equation (2.15) requires major modifications. We 
consider first the component of equation (2.15) represented by equation (2.13). Many of the 
unconstrained households engaging in short-term intertemporal substitution will nevertheless 
be affected by some or all of the three types of credit constraints distinguished.  Suppose that 
financial liberalization relaxes all three constraints simultaneously, and that we can observe a 
univariate indicator, FLIB, of the ease of credit conditions. Relaxing the first type of credit 
constraint implies a positive, direct effect of FLIB on consumption, and also an indirect effect 
via interaction with income uncertainty (reducing the role of the latter in the f(xt) term of 
equation (2.13)). An easing of the second type of credit constraint, the housing deposit 
constraint, also generates a positive, direct effect of FLIB on consumption. This has a further 
indirect effect. Saving for a housing deposit is also an increasing function of the house price 
to income ratio. Easing the credit constraint reduces the negative contribution this makes to 
the aggregate effect of house prices on consumption.  Finally, when the asset term  1 /
uu
tt Ay γ − is 
disaggregated into the main liquid and illiquid asset types, we need to interact at least the 
housing asset component with FLIB to reflect the greater “spendability” of housing wealth 
with a reduction of the third type of credit constraint. 
  Turning to the component of equation (2.15) represented by equation (2.7), which 
largely reflects the behaviour of those subject to the first type of credit constraint, on the 
arguments of Deaton (1991, 1992) it is plausible that it should be replaced by  
 
                                                 
11  Owner-occupation has advantages in many societies, for example a preferred tax status, lower long-
run costs than renting and the elimination of agency costs of landlords.   10 
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 However, as such households build 
up buffer-stocks of liquid assets, the role of intertemporal substitution increases so that 
behaviour increasingly resembles that of households following equation (2.13). Replacing 
equation (2.7) by equation (2.18) in equation (2.15), results in the addition of two terms, 
tt g βπ and (1 ) tt g β π −∆  . 
  As noted above, the consumption share of credit-constrained households, πt, is 
diminishing both in FLIBt and in the real rate of interest rt . In practice, it is likely that 
identifying separately all the multiple channels through which FLIB operates will prove 
impossible. We investigate below four possible channels: through πt ; a direct positive effect 
on consumption; and interaction effects with income uncertainty and with assets, particularly 
housing. 
  In practice, another important modification concerns the aggregation of assets into a 
single quantity, A, in equations (2.5) or (2.13), which is an oversimplification. We argue that 
wealth effects differ according to the liquidity characteristics of different types of wealth. 
Households usually hold a balance of assets—liquid assets, which can easily be converted 
into expenditures when needed, and illiquid assets, which typically yield higher rates of 
return. This suggests that we should associate different weights reflecting different 
propensities to spend with different types of assets and debt.
12 
  Housing, pension funds, and life insurance funds are at the illiquid end of the 
spectrum.
13  Pension wealth is likely to have a delayed impact on consumption. Contractual 
saving contribution rates often respond with considerable lags to changes in the asset values 
of such pension funds, suggesting that we should test for longer lags on consumption. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Results for South Africa
14 
 
3.1 Wealth  Data 
 
The SARB does not compile balance sheet wealth estimates on a market value basis of the 
type produced by the US Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of England and the Office of 
National Statistics in the UK and comparable organizations in Japan and elsewhere.  With 
some difficulty, it is possible to derive estimates for South Africa from existing data. The 
wealth estimates on a market value basis used in this paper were constructed in Muellbauer 
and Aron (1999), and appear to be the first systematic attempt to construct such figures for 
South Africa. 
                                                 
12  Several studies, such as Patterson (1984), allow different weights on liquid and illiquid assets, 
whereas others, such as Zellner, Huang, and Chau (1965) and Hendry and von Ungern Sternberg 
(1981), include the effects of liquid assets alone. 
13 Housing wealth is a special case because housing has consumption as well as wealth value   
(housing services also appear in the utility function). Thus an increase in the real price of housing has 
both an income and a substitution effect on consumption, partly offsetting the wealth effect. See Miles 
(1994), and, for a simple derivation, see Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995). 
14  The computations were performed in Hall, Cummins and Schnake’s Time Series Processor (TSP 
4.4) package.   11 
  There were two main problems in deriving these wealth estimates for the personal 
sector.  Most asset data published by the SARB are on a book-value and not on a market-
value basis, and required revaluation adjustments using appropriate asset price indices. 
Secondly, for some asset classes, e.g. household liquid assets and directly-held bonds, the 
SARB publish only flow-of-funds data and no benchmarks. Appropriate estimates of the 
relevant benchmarks needed to be made, and the flows of funds data cumulated, and, where 
necessary, revalued to market prices. Further, there are problems of omission of some wealth 
components.
15 
The estimates of illiquid and liquid personal wealth are shown in Figure 2.  The 
household liquid assets ratio seems to have been relatively stable in the 1970s. In the 1980s, 
however, households' holdings of liquid assets relative to non-property income fell sharply.  
This coincided with both a drop in the personal saving ratio, as implied by the income and 
expenditure accounts, and a switch to saving in pension and retirement funds offering 
superior returns to those on liquid assets.  
  Pension wealth has grown relative to income since the 1980s despite the fall in the 
personal saving ratio, and has greatly exceeded the growth of debt.
16 Yet, although pension 
wealth is now the single biggest asset, its growth has been offset to a considerable degree by 
the decline of housing wealth relative to income.  
 
3.2 Financial  Liberalization 
 
An indicator of the degree of credit market liberality, FLIB, is required to drive the direct, 
positive effects on consumption; the varying parameter πt ; the “spendability” weights of 
asset components; and other possible interaction effects, for example with income uncertainty 
and income growth. Proxying FLIB by the ratio of debt to income, as in Bayoumi (1993a, 
1993b) and Sarno and Taylor (1998), is not ideal because this ratio responds with a lag to 
deregulation and depends too on income expectations, asset levels, uncertainty, and interest 
rates. Bandiera et al (2000) propose the technique of principal components to summarize the 
composite information in a set of dummy variables reflecting different facets of financial 
liberalization. However, the weights do not reflect the behavioural  impact of financial 
liberalization. A flexible technique linking institutional information with behavioural 
responses is needed.  
Our innovation is to treat financial liberalization as an unobservable indicator entering 
both household debt and consumption equations. The indicator, FLIB, is proxied by a linear 
spline function, and the parameters of this function are estimated jointly with the 
consumption and debt equations (subject to cross-equation restrictions on the coefficients in 
the spline function).  
                                                 
15  The SARB has not attempted any estimates of gold and foreign assets held by the personal sector. 
Despite exchange controls, there were inevitable loopholes, which suggests a significant 
undercounting of asset ownership. Non-housing assets owned by unincorporated businesses are also 
omitted. A third problem concerns the relationship between explicit funding of pensions and 
perceived entitlements, particularly for public sector pensions. There could have been considerable 
fluctuations in the relationship between recorded pension wealth and the perceived levels relevant for 
expenditure decisions. This problem is not unique to South Africa, however. 
16  Three factors behind this growth are the relaxation of restrictions on official pension funds (for 
government employees), which had prevented their holding of equities (Mouton Report 1992); 
improvement in the returns on government and parastatal bonds with deregulation of interest rates 
after 1980 and declining inflation in the 1990s; and relaxation of prescribed holdings of government 
bonds for all pension funds.   12 
The government initiated financial liberalization following the de Kock Commission 
reports (1978, 1985) advocating a more market-oriented monetary policy. Interest and credit 
controls were removed from 1980, and banks’ liquidity ratios were reduced substantially 
between 1983 and 1985. However, there may have been a temporary reversal after the third 
quarter of 1985 as a result of South Africa’s international debt crisis, when net capital inflows 
dropped sharply. Competition intensified in the mortgage market following the 1986 Building 
Societies Act, and amendments to the Act in 1987-88. Demutualization and takeovers in 
1989-90 consolidated the stronger competition in the credit market. In the 1990s pensions 
were increasingly used to provide additional collateral for housing loans; while from 1995, 
special mortgage accounts (“access bond accounts”) allowed households to borrow and pay 
back flexibly from these accounts up to an agreed limit set by the value of their housing 
collateral. After the 1994 elections more black South Africans obtained formal employment, 
particularly in the public sector, gaining access to credit that they may previously have been 
denied.
17 Exchange controls on nonresidents were eliminated in early 1995: large nonresident 
capital inflows from mid-1994 induced a temporary endogenous financial liberalization. 
Finally, exchange controls on domestic residents, in existence since before the 1960s, were 
partially relaxed after 1997. 
  This qualitative portrait has implications for our univariate measure of financial 
liberalization, FLIB.
18  The first is of a monotonic rise in the indicator: that is, no reversals, 
with the possible exception of a temporary episode after late 1985. The second is for 
particularly strong rises in 1984, in and after 1987, some consolidation in the early 1990s, and 
a renewed rise after 1994.  Unfortunately, available information on institutional changes does 
not permit further quantitative implications to be drawn. 
We define FLIB using a linear spline function. Define a dummy, D, which is zero up 
to 1983Q4 and is 1 from 1984Q1. The 4-quarter moving average, DMA84, then takes the 
values 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 in the 4 quarters, respectively, of 1984, and the value 1 thereafter. 
We define DMA85 to be the 4-quarter lag of DMA84, and define DMA86 to DMA97 to be 
the corresponding 8- to 48-quarter lags of DMA84. We then define the spline function:  
 
97 97 ... 85 85 84 84 DMA d DMA d DMA d FLIB × + + × + × =              (3.1) 
 
where up to 14 parameters (i.e. d84 to d97) are estimated.
19 The “knots” in the spline function 
occur in the first quarter of each year (i.e. it can shift shape in the first quarter of each year). 
Under the constraint that the parameters to be non-negative (i.e. that there is no reversal in 
financial liberalization), in practice only six parameters are needed to define FLIB. Eight 
parameters are required when a reversal in 1996 is permitted (see below). 
The estimated parameters for FLIB in the model reflect the key institutional changes 
in credit markets. Our estimated indicator shows strong rises in 1984, 1988, and 1995, with 
more moderate increases in 1989, 1990, and 1996 (Figure 3). The indicator, FLIBR, which 
permits a 1986 reversal, otherwise moves very similarly. It is noteworthy that both the 
consumption function and debt equation are subject to major structural breaks (failing Chow 
tests) when allowance is not made for financial liberalization. 
 
 
                                                 
17  Note, however, that total formal employment continued to decline. 
18  A more detailed account of financial liberalization in South Africa is contained in Aron and 
Muellbauer (forthcoming). 
19  We also test for evidence of financial liberalization back to 1980, when interest rate controls on 
deposit accounts first began to be lifted.  However, as we shall see, we can exclude such effects.   13 
3.3  Income-forecasting Equations   
 
During the 1980s in South Africa, there were significant regime changes with the move to 
new operating procedures for monetary policy and a series of internal financial 
liberalizations. Periodically, serious political crises entailed the increasing international 
isolation of South Africa, reflected in diminished trade and finance, while its mineral 
dependency as a primary exporter gives an important role to terms of trade shocks in 
determining income growth.  
  We derive a 4-quarter-ahead forecasting model for the rate of growth of real per 
capita disposable non-property income, and build in allowances for these features as well for 
a more standard income-expenditure approach for analysing the deviations of income from 
trend. A smooth stochastic trend satisfactorily represents long-run changes in productivity 
growth of the kind one might expect in an economy subject to such regime changes. Further, 
an institutional measure of the shift in monetary policy in the early 1980s is crossed with the 
interest rates. By incorporating important regime shifts in the model, the consumption 
function including these income growth forecasts should be fairly immune to the Lucas 
critique. 
  Income is modelled using an extended version of stochastic trend models of the type 
recommended by Harvey (1993) and Harvey and Jaeger (1993), and was estimated using the 
STAMP programme of Koopman et al (1995).
20 The model has the following linear reduced 
form: 
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where yt is real per capita disposable non-property income; STOCHt is constructed to be a 
smooth stochastic I(2) trend reflecting the underlying capacity of the economy to produce and 
to sustain personal incomes; and the Xjt include a range of possible determinants of income, 
discussed below. 
  This equation can be reformulated as an equilibrium correction formulation with a 
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We report the coefficients of equation (3.2) directly. Note that the difference between log y 
and STOCH/α1 is I(1), given the low variance of the I(2) variable, STOCH. Hence, one can 
think of equation (3.3) as representing a cointegrating relationship in which the deviation 
from trend of log y is cointegrated with those Xj components, which are I(1). 
                                                 
20  The background for the approach, tailored for the U.S. economy, is set out in Muellbauer (1996), 
which successfully forecasts income growth up to three years ahead. The key variables are the change 
in nominal (and sometimes real) short-term interest rates, the real exchange rate (a measure of 
international competitiveness), the trade surplus to GDP ratio, the government surplus to GDP ratio 
and the change in a real share price index.  These variables explain the deviation in income from 
trend, where the trend is represented either by a linear trend subject to changes in slope or a smooth 
stochastic trend, which does not impose changes in trend a priori but allows them to be estimated 
flexibly.   Parameter shifts in the income-forecasting relationships appear to take place at broadly the 
dates suggested by prior information about policy regimes, corroborated by the shifts in the estimated 
feedback rules, and in the direction predicted by theory.     14 
  The set of explanatory variables Xj include the level of real interest rates and changes 
in nominal interest rates, the government surplus to GDP ratio, capacity utilisation and a real 
stock market price index. Poor data for unemployment in South Africa precluded the 
inclusion of an unemployment rate, as in Muellbauer (1996). We proxy the expected negative 
effect of unemployment on subsequent growth in real non-property income by using the two-
year change in log capacity utilization ∆8  log(CAPUT), which is I(0). The model also 
captures the changing sensitivity of income growth to interest rates as the monetary policy 
regime changed, by employing a dummy indicator constructed from the changing prescribed 
liquid asset requirements for commercial banks in the 1980s. The variables are defined in 
Table 1, where stationarity and other statistics are presented. 
  A general-to-specific testing procedure on quarterly data for 1966-97 was applied to a 
version of equation (3.2) with a restricted lag structure. For lags longer than three, we restrict 
the dynamics to fourth differences or four-quarter moving averages, to prevent 
overparameterisation.  This gives the parsimonious equation shown in the first column of 
Table 2. In the process of simplification from the general forms, the data suggested several 
transformations, in particular, moving average versions of some of the key regressors. Two 
other forecasting equations are reported for shorter samples to demonstrate parameter 
stability, given that Chow tests are unavailable in STAMP.
21  
   In the parsimonious equations reported, the only I(1) variables are the real interest rate 
and the real share price index, which are expected to form a cointegrating vector with the 
deviation of log income from the stochastic trend.  
  Turning to the parameter estimates, nominal rises in interest rates and levels of real 
rates have strong negative effects on subsequent growth. The shift toward more market-
oriented monetary policy in the 1980s appears to have weakened the influence of changes in 
nominal rates. The shift is picked up by interacting ∆4 (PRIME) with the liquid asset ratio 
measure, where PRIME is the prime rate of interest for borrowing from banks.
22 Before the 
shift, high liquidity ratios and other quantitative methods of controlling credit growth were 
correlated with changes in nominal rates, exaggerating the apparent influence of interest rates 
on growth. After the shift, firms and households could also refinance more easily, so that 
higher interest rates had a weaker effect on expenditures. However, although most of the 
effect of changes in nominal interest rates disappears, the greater volatility of interest rates in 
the market regime means that the proportion of the variance of growth explained by interest 
rates remains high. Figure 4 shows the composite contribution of the interest rate effects to 
the explanation of future income. 
The contribution of the stochastic trend is also shown in Figure 4. This reflects a 
decline in the underlying growth rate in the early 1980s into negative values, associated with 
more rapid population growth, as well as the productivity losses resulting from South 
Africa’s increasing isolation - for example, the inefficient production of petrol from coal, 
under trade sanctions which constrained oil imports. From the late 1980’s the underlying rate 
of decline of income per head was less steep. 
                                                 
21  The forecasts are based on full-sample estimates, not recursive estimates, since recursive 
estimation is unavailable in STAMP.  However, stability tests for the equation carried out over 
different samples confirm parameter stability so that the recursive forecasts are unlikely to differ 
much from those based on a full-sample parameter estimates. 
22  The liquid asset measure in itself proved insignificant in the equation, as was the interactive effect 
with RPRIME (expressed as a moving average).   15 
The model suggests that government deficits have persistent negative effects on 
subsequent income growth.
23 These effects could reflect typical concerns that budget deficits 
will be followed by higher taxes or lower government expenditures; but these deficits may 
also signal political shocks.  In the past, political unrest was often followed by higher social 
or military expenditures, which thus may serve as a proxy for a direct negative effect on 
growth through falling investment. Changes in capacity utilization, proxying changes in labor 
market tightness, have the expected positive effects on nonproperty income.  Finally, the JSE 
index, sensitive to changes in the price of gold and other minerals, captures the positive effect 
that improving terms of trade have on income, and may also reflect other information about 
the future embodied in share prices. The empirical contribution of these variables is shown in 
Figure 5. 
  To test for parameter stability, two sample breaks were chosen. The first, from the 
third quarter of 1989, coincides with the new monetary regime of Governor Stals and an 
increased momentum of political change under the new President de Klerk, initiated by the 
release of political prisoner, Nelson Mandela. The second, from the second quarter of 1994, 
captures the transition to a democratic government. The parameter estimates from the shorter 
samples, as well as other samples not reported, are close to those of the full period suggesting 
that once structural change has been accounted for as described above, the remaining 
parameters are stable. There is no evidence of autocorrelated residuals. Tests for normality 
and heteroscedasticity are also satisfactory. 
 
3.4  The  Household Debt Equation 
 
In contrast to the vast literature on consumption, little has been written on the theory of debt 
holding by consumers, and little systematic econometric work exists.  The canonical REPIH 
model of the representative consumer has little to contribute to understanding the 
determination of aggregate household debt. In this model there is only a single asset, so that it 
can explain only the evolution of aggregate net wealth. In practice, consumers have multiple 
motives for holding debt. These include consumption smoothing through temporary income 
downturns; or in anticipation of higher future income, financing the acquisition of consumer 
durables and housing, human capital investment through education or training, or portfolio 
investment in financial assets when returns prospects look favourable; and to offset what 
could otherwise be excessive amounts of saving implied by occupational pension rules.  
  Given asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, assets have an 
important collateral role. Most debt is backed by collateral in the form of durables, housing 
and other assets. Moreover, since much of household saving in liquid asset form is recycled 
by the financial system into lending for other households, it is clear that the current end-of-
period household debt should depend on liquid and illiquid asset stocks as well as on debt at 
the end of the previous period. Variables such as income, interest rates and proxies for 
income uncertainty, reflecting economic conditions during the period, will also influence 
current debt. Indeed, we expect long-run proportionality, given income, between household 
debt and asset holdings. This makes a log formulation convenient, linking the debt to income 
ratio with log ratios to income of the various assets, and to the log of real income. 
  Financial liberalization could impact in several ways on this long-run relationship. A 
direct, positive effect on debt could result from the different facets of financial liberalization, 
with, for example, more freely available credit card loans, lower housing downpayments as a 
                                                 
23  In contrast, in the U.S. (Muellbauer, 1996), there is evidence that before the heightened concern 
with government deficits in the 1980s, there was a negative “Keynesian” response of output to the 
government surplus.   16 
fraction of house values, and housing equity loans more freely available to existing owners. 
There may also be (indirect) interaction effects from financial liberalisation. One expects 
increased coefficients on housing and pension wealth to income ratios, in part because of 
their more liberal use as collateral. A reduced coefficient on liquid assets is likely, as bank 
lending then becomes less constrained by liquid deposit holdings of the personal sector.   
However, in the long-run, debt should move in proportion to assets as a whole, even after 
financial liberalization. Other possible interaction effects are with income uncertainty, 
expected to become less of a constraint on debt after financial liberalization; and with income 
growth expectations, which should become more significant, reflecting the desires of 
households to borrow. One might also expect a negative real and/or nominal interest rate 
effect, the latter representing cash limits on debt service ratios.  
  To summarize, in the long-run, we expect effects from assets, income and the real or 
nominal interest rate on borrowing (income uncertainty, income, inflation, and interest rate 
dynamics might be expected to be relevant in the shorter run):  
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where log(RDB0) is log ratio of household debt (end of quarter) to current seasonally-
adjusted personal disposable non-property income; log(RLA), log(RPA), log(RHA) and 
log(RIFA) are the log ratios, respectively, of liquid assets, pension assets, housing assets and 
directly-held, illiquid financial assets such as bonds and equities (all end of  previous quarter) 
to the above measure of current income
24; and log(RYN) is the log of real per capita personal 
disposable non-property income. 
  From the above discussion, the coefficients  4 1,...,α α  should shift with financial 
liberalization; homogeneity in wealth would imply  1 6 4 3 2 = + + + α α α α ; and we also expect 
0 5 > α . 
  Following a general-to-specific testing procedure in an error correction model, we 
estimated an equation for log(RDB0) for 1970Q2 to 1983Q4, prior to the period of significant 
financial liberalization.  The results are shown in Table 3 (see Table 1 for definitions of 
variables). The long-run solution for the parsimonious equation in the first column comes 
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where the asset measures are as above, with RPAMA the four quarter moving average of last 
quarter’s pension assets (reflecting delays by which pension and insurance funds adjust 
contribution rates to changing asset values). However, no significant positive effect from 
directly-held illiquid financial assets, log(RIFA), could be found. 
  All the variables in equation (3.5) are I(1), and evidence supports cointegration in the 
period 1970-83. The hypothesis of asset homogeneity can easily be accepted. We can also 
accept the hypothesis of equal coefficients on housing and pension asset wealth for this 
period. 
                                                 
24  Directly-held illiquid financial assets such as bonds and equities, IFA, could also be included with 
pension assets. However, it seems plausible that their potential use as collateral has not been much 
affected by financial liberalization.   17 
  Turning to the short-run effects, both real and nominal interest rate level effects are 
perverse
25 though insignificant; but the change in the nominal rate has a significant negative 
effect. Another negative short-run effect is due to ∆log(YN), the growth rate of nominal non-
property income (needed, as the dependent variable is deflated by current income while the 
assets terms are deflated by lagged income). Income growth expectations have a positive but 
insignificant effect. The lagged change in capacity utilisation (proxying income uncertainty) 
has a significant positive effect.  
  As noted above, financial liberalization will have both direct and interactive effects on 
this relationship.  As well as increasing the effects of log(RHA) and perhaps log(RPAMA), 
and reducing the effects of log(RLA), one would expect income uncertainty to matter less to 
households when credit is easily available. We build in these interaction effects when we 
estimate over the full sample to 1997Q4. The results suggest a significant rise in the housing 
wealth coefficient and a significant fall in the income uncertainty effect. However the shift in 
the pension wealth effect is insignificant. 
  The precise functional form estimated is as follows: 
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where β1 = 2β5 + β7 reflects the homogeneity of debt with respect to wealth.  
  The full-sample results for the debt equation, estimated jointly with the consumption 
equation, and imposing cross-equation parameter restrictions for the FLIB function, are 
shown in Table 3, column 1. Both direct and interactive effects from financial liberalization 
are incorporated. The FLIB spline function is shown in equation (3.1)′, where coefficients are 
estimated subject to non-negativity restrictions
26:   
 
  FLIB = 0.109 DMA84 + 0.230 DMA88 + 0.061 DMA89 + 0.051 DMA90 
              (5.8)                    (8.3)                   (2.3)                    (2.2) 
    + 0.118 DMA95 + 0.074 DMA96 
              (5.9)                   (3.3)    (3.1)′ 
 
Our estimates suggest a direct, long-run effect of financial liberalization on the log of 
household debt of around 32 percent (coefficient θ1 of 0.13), given the estimated value of 
FLIB is 0.64 at the end of 1996. The interaction effects suggest that financial liberalization 
effectively doubled the long-run coefficient on housing wealth from 0.46 before 1984 to 1.0 
for the full sample to 1997. Similarly, the coefficient on liquid assets was reduced from 0.57 
to 0.03. Thus, the total long-run impact of FLIB can be calculated as 
1 6 1 / )) log (log ( β β θ RLA RHA FLIB − + . Comparing debt in 1996/97 with debt in 1983 gives a 
total effect on the log of the debt-to-income ratio of 0.38 (a rise of around 46 percent). This 
calculation takes income and assets as given, however. 
                                                 
25  The findings of Aron and Muellbauer (forthcoming) suggest two possible explanations for this 
result. The interest policy rule appears to raise interest rates with excess money growth (strongly 
correlated with credit growth) and with financial liberalization. These sources of endogeneity are 
likely to bias the estimated effects of interest rates on debt. 
26  Given that these coefficients are otherwise unrestricted, an identifying restriction is needed on the 
direct effect of FLIB in either the consumption and debt equations. We set the long-run direct effect 
of FLIB in the consumption equation to be θ2 = 0.3333.   18 
  Examining the short-run interaction between FLIB and the income uncertainty proxy, 
∆log (CAPUT), suggests that by the end of the period the rise in FLIB has almost eliminated 
the uncertainty effect. The other parameters of the debt equation are quite stable over the two 
sample periods, 1970-97 and 1970-83, shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively, of Table 3, 
and diagnostics are generally satisfactory.  
 
3.5  The  Consumption Equation 
 
In Section 2, we explained the various extensions required to the aggregate consumption 
equation (2.15) to incorporate different aspects of financial liberalization, a range of weights 
for different types of assets, and the argument that many credit-constrained households do not 
only spend current income. Before turning to an explicit model incorporating these features, 
two income measurement issues should be considered.  
  First, although self-employment is part of the theoretical definition of non-property 
income, these data are not separately available in the South African national accounts. The 
real, per capita, non-property income measure RYN consists of tax-adjusted income from 
employment and transfers from the government. We assume self-employment (a major 
component of property income in other countries) is highly correlated with property income 
in South Africa. If tax-adjusted, self-employment income were a constant fraction ϕ  of 
property income RYP, we could replace RYN  by  ) 1 ( RYN RYP RYN RYP RYN ϕ ϕ + = + . In 
our log-formulation, this suggests  RYN RYP  as an additional regressor. 
  The second issue concerns the measurement of RYN. In constructing quarterly 
national income accounts, small timing discrepancies may arise between quarters, particularly 
in tax payments. Thus, the income relevant for consumption in quarter t is more likely to be a 
moving average of current and last quarter’s recorded income e.g. λ log(RYN)t + (1-λ) 
log(RYN)t-1 instead of log(RYN)t.  This will influence the short run dynamics. Aggregating 
across credit-constrained and unconstrained consumers leads to the income growth term in 
 π(1-β)∆logyt being replaced by a weighted average of current and lagged growth, and 
similarly in the ‘equilibrium correction’ term β(logyt - logct-1). Empirically, we also examine 
an alternative weighting: λlog(RYN)t + (1-λ)log(RYNMA)t , where RYNMA is the 4-quarter 
moving average of RYN.  Note that this will give a weight of λ+(1-λ)/4 to current income. 
  As discussed in Section 2, the consumption share of credit-constrained households, π, 
should be a diminishing function of FLIB and of the real interest rate.  In practice, given a 
number of other interaction effects, it seems this effect cannot be estimated with any 
accuracy.  However, there does appear to be some variation in π with the moving average of 
the real interest rate, RPRIMA. This suggests working with the specification πt = π0 + π1 
RPRIMAt but allowing a direct effect of FLIB on consumption and testing for the full range 
of interaction effects (with assets, income uncertainty, income growth expectations and the 
real interest rate). After allowing the coefficients of income growth expectations, income 
uncertainty and the real interest rates to be weighted by (1-πt)β as in equation (2.15), only 
income uncertainty and possibly housing wealth interacts significantly with FLIBt. 
  The resulting equation takes the following form (see Table 1 for variable definitions 
and summary statistics): 
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Note that Q1DU75 is a pre-1976 seasonal to reflect mismeasured seasonal correction in the 
data before that date.  DST78 and DST84 are dummies taking values +1, -1 in successive 
quarters, reflecting shifting of expenditure in anticipation of increases in sales tax in 1978 and 
in 1984.  We expect β,  λ and π to lie between zero and one; c2>0, to reflect some 
consumption impact from property income
27; and c3 > c4 (liquid assets minus debt are more 
spendable than directly-held stocks and shares, housing and pension wealth).  We test below 
for equal weights on RHA, RIFA and RPAMA.  We expect c5 > 0, since FLIB increases the 
“spendability” of housing wealth (the effect of FLIB on the “spendability” of pension wealth, 
however, being empirically very small). Finally, c6 > 0 (growth expectations), c7 < 0 (real 
interest rate), c8 > 0, β9 < 0 (∆log(capacity utilization), an uncertainty proxy which weakens 
as FLIB rises)
28 and θ2 >0, so that FLIB has a direct positive effect on consumption.  Either 
θ1 in the debt equation, or θ2 , has to be set at same value to identify the coefficients on the 
components of the FLIB spline function.   
  This equation corresponds closely to the theory discussed in section 2, and tests of 
more general dynamics all accept this specification. Estimation results are given in Table 4, 
column 1. The adjustment speed is relatively high, suggesting around 60 percent of a full 
adjustment to shocks takes place in the current quarter.  The consumption share of credit-
constrained consumers of 0.35 when the real interest rate is zero, is within the 0.2 to 0.6 
range suggested by Euler equations studies by Campbell and Mankiw (1991).
29 Given 
enormous income and wealth disparities in South Africa, this would suggest a rather higher 
proportion of credit-constrained households. Note that πt falls as the real interest rate rises. 
Given π1 = 3.5, then πt = 0.175 at a 5 percent real prime rate. In practice, higher real interest 
rates have accompanied financial liberalization, and the model then implies a lower 
consumption share of credit-constrained households. 
  For credit-unconstrained households, the income growth expectations effect is 
significant, suggesting a weight on next year’s income of about 30 percent of that on current 
income. The real interest rate effect is significantly negative suggesting that a rise in the real 
rate of 1 percent will cut consumption of credit-unconstrained consumers by 0.25 percent in 
the long-run. When FLIB is 0, the short-run income uncertainty effect represented by the ∆
log(capacity utilization) term suggests a 1 percent improvement in utilization over one 
quarter results in a 0.6 percent boost to short-term average consumption.  But when FLIB 
reaches its peak value of 0.64, the effect is eliminated.  Note that for aggregate consumption 
                                                 
27  As argued above, this is a proxy for self-employment income. “Property income” also includes 
dividend payments from incorporated and non-incorporated enterprises, so that c2>0 could also reflect 
an element of myopia by households about the corporate veil. 
28  Note that β9 is constrained to be the same in the debt and consumption equations, so that the 
proportionate reduction in the uncertainty effect with financial liberalization is the same for debt as 
for consumption. This restriction passes an empirical test. 
29  The freely estimated coefficient is 0.32, but with a standard error of 0.30.  Setting the coefficient to 
0.35 guarantees that π remains non-negative over the sample period.   20 
these effects are all weighted by 1-πt so that when the share of credit-constrained 
consumption falls the effects are bigger.
30 
  For credit-unconstrained consumers, the long-run wealth effects are large.
31 They 
imply a marginal propensity of 0.15 to spend from liquid assets and 0.07 from illiquid assets, 
consistent with shorter time horizons than theorists often attribute to consumers. Thus, 
housing assets are about half as spendable as liquid assets when FLIB is 0. When the 
coefficients on the four major asset-to-income ratios, RLADB, RHA, RIFA and RPAMA are 
estimated separately, the results (with standard errors in parentheses) are 0.165 (0.046), 0.073 
(0.011), 0.055 (0.020) and 0.076 (0.020).  The hypothesis that the three illiquid assets have 
the same coefficients is easily accepted.  The increase in “spendability” as FLIB rises is not 
accurately estimated: the point estimate is 0.01, with a standard error of 0.07.  This is 
probably the result of the trend-like decline in RHA since 1984. We therefore restrict the 
coefficient to zero. However, the rise in FLIB also has a direct effect on consumption 
measured by θ2 = 0.333, which is an identifying restriction, as noted earlier. Noting that FLIB 
peaks at 0.64, this implies a direct long-run impact of FLIB on the log of consumption of 
0.213, when comparing 1996/97 with 1983, that is, around 24 percent. 
  In Figure 6, we show the estimated contribution of fluctuations in the different 
variables in equation (3.7) to the variations in the log of consumption to income. It is 
important to realise that these are partial equilibrium effects. Thus, the striking direct 
contribution of financial liberalisation was partly offset by three factors themselves 
influenced by financial liberalization (see Aron and Muellbauer, 2000, for further discussion). 
These factors were the rise in real interest rates, the deterioration in the liquid assets minus 
debt balance and the rise in property income relative to non-property income. 
  Estimates for the short sample, 1970:2 to 1983:4, when FLIB is zero, are reported in 
Table 4, column 2. The parameter estimates are much in line with the full sample estimates. 
Indeed, the full sample equation’s standard error is below that for the short sample, 
suggesting the parameter shifts have been handled successfully. 
  In the full-sample estimates discussed so far, we have imposed the restriction of no 
reversals in FLIB.  However, as noted in our discussion of financial liberalization in South 
Africa, the debt crisis in the second half of 1985, associated with large net outflows, could 
also have had a negative impact on domestic credit conditions, despite liberalization of 
domestic institutional arrangements.  We allow for this in a specification of FLIB in which 
DMA86 and DMA87 are freely estimated.  We then estimate 
 
  FLIBR = 0.126 DMA84 - 0.057 DMA86 + 0.041 DMA87 + 0.220 DMA88 
              (6.2)                    (2.6)                   (1.6)                    (6.8) 
    + 0.060 DMA89 + 0.049 DMA90 + 0.117 DMA95 + 0.079 DMA96 
              (2.5)                       (2.2)                    (6.1)                    (3.7)   (3.1)′′ 
 
The corresponding estimates of the other parameters are shown in column 3 of Tables 3 and 
4.  These estimates are quite robust to the more general specification of FLIB. 
  In the results discussed so far, we have used a very simple proxy for income 
uncertainty,  ∆logCAPUTt-1, the lagged rate of the rate of change of capacity utilization.   
                                                 
30  Given the positive correlation between FLIB and RPRIMA, this therefore compensates in part for 
the negative interaction between income uncertainty and FLIB measured by β9. 
31  Note that in the simpler model version before financial liberalization, the logic of the model is that 
log (consumption/non-property income) is cointegrated with the ratios of property income, liquid 
assets minus debt and illiquid assets, to non-property income (these are all I(1) variables). A 
cointegration test supports this logic.   21 
However, we also experimented with a wide range of alternatives. These included linear 
combinations of the rate of acceleration in consumer prices, the residuals and their absolute 
values from our income-forecasting equation, and more naïve residuals taken as the deviation 
between current income growth and the moving average of income growth over the previous 
four years.  To improve identification, these linear combinations were estimated subject to 
the restrictions of proportional coefficients in the consumption and debt equation and the 
restriction of the same percentage impact of FLIB on this composite effect.  However, 
∆logCAPUTt-1 is statistically preferred against these more general models. 
  As noted above, our specification makes an allowance for temporary income mis-
measurement in the quarterly national accounts. We measure the log of current income as 
log (1 )log tt RYN RYNMA λλ +−  , where λ is estimated at 0.51 implying a weight of 0.63 on 
RYN and 0.37 on the moving average of the previous three quarters.  For this specification 
the four-quarter moving average of forecast income growth gives slightly better results than 
forecast growth dated t, even though it uses older information, on average. In an alternative 
specification where the log of current income is measured as  1 log (1 )log tt RYN RYN λλ − +− , 
λ is estimated at 0.80 (t = 12.7). 
  Under this specification, forecast growth dated t is preferred to its moving average, 
and the estimated coefficient is 0.19 (t = 2.1).  All other parameter estimates are very similar 
to those in columns 1 of Table 3 and 4, though the consumption equation standard error at 
0.00740 (versus 0.00718 in column 1) is higher, while the fit of the debt equation is 
unchanged. 
  We can test some hypotheses on whether households pierce the corporate veil and on 
Ricardian equivalence.  It is important to note that our model assumes that the corporate veil 
is pierced, except to the extent that dividend payments enter the property income/non-
property income ratio, RYP/RYN. This has a coefficient of 0.073, implying property income 
has only around 7 percent of the spending effect of non-property income. As noted above, 
most of this is probably reflecting self-employment income  (included in the available 
measure of property income). To investigate further, we need a measure of corporate 
dividend payments received by the personal sector, which is not available from the national 
accounts. One way of estimating these is to multiply the average dividend yield on equities 
quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange by our estimate of equities held directly and 
indirectly by the personal sector. After tax-adjustment it can be tested whether the ratio of 
these dividend payments (including lagged effects) to non-property income is significant 
when included in our consumption function. In the event they are not significant, and this 
result, together with the large wealth effect in the consumption function, suggest that affluent 
South African households largely pierced the corporate veil. 
  Regarding Ricardian equivalence, note that our model already incorporates an 
important negative effect on consumption from high government deficit to GDP ratios in the 
preceding three years, via income growth expectations. We can test whether there is an 
additional direct effect on consumption from this source by entering annual moving averages 
of the government surplus to GDP ratios for the current and the last two years in the 
consumption equation.  These effects are jointly and individually insignificant. 
  Another way of testing Ricardian equivalence is by examining the “spendability” 
coefficients of the government fixed interest components in wealth, part of which is directly-
held and part entering via pension wealth. The net effect in the model of column 1, Table 4, is 
captured by the coefficient, c4 (directly-held government securitiest-1 + four quarter moving 
average of pension fund-held government securitiest-1)/income.  To make the test as tight as 
possible, we multiply this term by c11 and test c11 = 0 versus c11 < 0. The point estimate is 
for a negative c11, but the hypothesis of a zero effect can be accepted.    22 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has argued that previous attempts to measure the effects of financial liberalization 
on consumption are unsatisfactory. Attempts to do so through Euler equations, modified as in 
Hall and Mishkin (1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991), suffer from four major 
limitations, two of these being mainly theoretical, and the other two, empirical. 
The theoretical limitations arise from two assumptions: that credit-constrained 
households simply spend their income; and that the effect of financial liberalization is 
confined to reducing the proportion or consumption share of credit-constrained households.   
The first of these has been shown to be inadequate by Deaton’s (1991, 1992) buffer-
stock model of consumption, under income uncertainty and credit constraints. The second 
assumption fails to recognize that there are three distinct elements of liberalization in credit 
markets. The literature predominantly focuses on one of these: the easing of restrictions on 
credit for consumers wishing to smooth consumption over time in response to higher 
expected future income (e.g. through easier access to unsecured bank loans and credit-card 
facilities). At least as important, however, are the two which operate mainly through 
mortgage markets: the reduction in down-payments by first-time home buyers, discussed by 
Japelli and Pagano (1994); and the more generous attitudes to new borrowing secured by 
existing housing collateral.  
The easing of credit in the mortgage market has the implication that consumption to 
income ratios will be raised as young consumers have to save for fewer years to accumulate 
the deposit required to access the housing ladder, while the ‘spendability’ of housing 
collateral of home-owners is increased. 
  Neglect of these theoretical effects reduces the usefulness of conventional modified 
Euler equations as empirical approximations. This is compounded by two empirical 
limitations. The first is endemic to the Euler equation approach: the neglect of long-run 
information, the importance of which is emphasized in the econometric literature on 
cointegration. The other empirical problem in the literature has been to identify proxies for 
financial liberalization.  Of these, the debt to income ratio has perhaps proved the most 
popular, but it risks confounding income, income expectations, interest rates and asset 
holdings with financial liberalization.   
This paper addresses each of these issues using data from South Africa. Apart from its 
intrinsic interest, South Africa is unusual for having experienced an extended period of credit 
market liberalization without having a boom in house prices, making it easier to distinguish 
the direct effects of liberalization from wealth effects.  
The determinants of personal consumption in South Africa from 1970 to 1997 were 
examined by means of a quarterly solved-out consumption function for households estimated 
jointly with an equation for household debt. This allowed a fuller treatment of a range of 
extensions and approximations to theoretical behaviour than is usual in the literature. 
Particular innovations were the inclusion of disaggregated asset effects, financial 
liberalization and income expectations, in addition to the more usual consumption 
determinants. The effects of financial liberalization were captured through a spline function 
common to both the consumption and household debt equations. The parameters incorporate 
qualitative information on the timing of key institutional changes in credit markets. We tested 
for the major channels of financial liberalization on consumption in South Africa: the channel 
through the consumption-share of credit-constrained households; a direct effect on the 
consumption to income ratio; and interaction effects with various assets and with income 
uncertainty proxies. Finally, we estimated households’ income forecasts one year ahead, 
taking account of important parameter shifts in the South African economy, for instance due   23 
to political shocks and monetary policy changes. These forecasts were then used in the 
consumption model. 
Our empirical consumption and household debt model corroborates the theory in this 
paper, confirms the relevance of financial liberalization, and implies that fluctuations in asset 
values have important implications for consumer spending and increasing household debt in 
South Africa. Moreover, income expectations are a significant factor and give a role for other 
macro-fundamentals to enter the model. The main factors explaining the consumption to 
income ratio in South Africa include positive effects from the asset to income ratios, financial 
liberalization and expected income growth; and direct, negative effects of real interest rates 
and income uncertainty. Even though the general equilibrium effects are likely to be 
substantially less than the partial equilibrium effects, the practical role of financial 
liberalization in lowering personal saving rates in South Africa is hard to deny, see Aron and 
Muellbauer (2000). 
  The consumption model estimates throw light on the monetary transmission 
mechanism in South Africa, showing that there are multiple channels for the effect of interest 
rates on consumption expenditure. A rise in short-term interest rates has negative direct 
effects on consumer spending, but there appear to be even larger indirect effects via income 
expectations and asset prices. In the absence of wealth stock data for South Africa, these 
apparently large asset effects have not previously been measured. Given the multiple possible 
influences on asset prices - including foreign interest rates and foreign equity prices - to 
quantify the marginal effect of domestic interest rate changes alone requires separate models 
for the main asset prices of equities, bonds and housing, in addition to the consumption 
function and income forecasts. This remains an important task for future work. 
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 ∆4log(RYN)  Annualised real income growth rate (seas. 
adj.)  
6.74E-3 3.54E-2 -5.20**  - 
log(RYN)  Log of real income(nppdi) per capita (seas. 
adj.) 
8.14 1.06E-1 -2.20  -3.84** 
RPRIMA  Real prime interest rate/100 (4 quarter MA)  3.56E-2 4.02E-2  -3.28* -3.78** 
∆4PRIME  Annual change of prime interest rate/100  4.31E-3 2.79E-2 -4.81**  - 
∆8log(CAPUT)  2 year growth rate in the manufacturing 
capacity utilisation index 
-2.21E-3 3.65E-2  -4.96**  - 
GSURMA12  Gov. surplus to GDP ratio (12 quarter MA)  -4.27E-2 1.44E-2  -3.48**  - 
Monetary regime shift 
dummy 
Dummy progressing from 0 to 1  
in 1983:2-1985:4 , derived from short term 
liquid asset requirements 
- - -  - 
N∆4PRIME  Monetary regime shift dummy x ∆4 PRIME  6.67E-4 2.19  E-2 -5.31**  - 
RLJSER  Log ratio of the all-share JSE index to the 
consumer price deflator 




Debt Equation  
 
     
∆ log(RDB0)  Growth rate of debt (eocp) to annualised 
current income 
4.49E-3 2.50E-2 -6.52**  - 
log(RDB0)  Log of ratio of debt (eopp) to annualised 
current income 
-5.57E-1 1.61E-1  1.23  -6.47** 
∆4 log(PRIME)  Annual growth rate of prime interest rate/100  3.30E-2 1.93E-1 -4.44**  - 
∆
 log(CAPUT)  Growth rate in manufacturing capacity  
utilisation index 
2.01E-4 9.49E-3 -5.15**  - 
log(RYN)  Log of real income (nppdi) per capita  
(seas. adj.) 
8.18 6.93E-2 -2.12  -3.81** 
log(RHA)  Log  ratio of housing wealth (eopp)  
to annualised current income 
5.81E-1 1.85E-1  -1.05  -4.77** 
 ∆
 log(YN)  Nominal per capita nppdi growth rate  
(seas. adj.) 
2.87E-2 1.89E-2 -9.91**  - 
log(RPAMA)  Log ratio of pension assets (eopp, 4 quart. 
MA) to annualised current income 
-7.75E-2 3.90E-1  -1.03  -5.06** 
log(RLA)  Log  ratio of liquid assets (eopp)  
to annualised current income 





Consumption Equation  
     
∆
 log(RC)  Growth rate of real personal consumption  
(seas. adj.) 
1.26E-3 1.50E-2 -9.85**  - 
RYP/RYN  Ratio of property income to non-property 
income 
2.34E-1 6.27E-2 -3.94**  - 
Log(RC)  log of real personal consumption (seas. adj.)  8.32 4.60E-2 -2.38  -9.68** 
Log(RYN)  Log of real income (nppdi) per capita  
(seas. adj.) 
8.18 6.93E-2 -2.12  -3.81** 
 ∆
 log(RYN)  Real income growth (seas. Adj.)  5.44E-4 1.92E-2 -3.81**  - 
 ∆4
 log(RYN (+4))
forcst  Forecast annualised real income growth rate  
(from section 2.2, (b)) 
-6.60E-4 3.27E-2  -3.54**  - 
RPRIMA  Real prime rate/100 (4 quart. MA)  3.52E-2 4.37E-2  -2.31  -6.97** 
∆
 log(CAPUT)  Growth rate in manuf. Capacity  
Utilisation index 















RLADB  ratio of (liquid assets (eopp) – debt (eopp))  
to annualised current income  
1.20E-1 2.70E-1  0.15  -5.57** 
RIFA  Ratio of directly-held securities (eopp)  
to annualised current income 
3.79E-1 1.29E-1  -2.17  -9.80** 
RHA  Ratio of housing wealth (eopp)  
to annualised current income 
1.82 3.31E-1 -1.29  -4.75** 
RPAMA  ratio of pension assets (eopp, 4 quart. MA)  
to annualised current income 
1.00 4.33E-1 2.46  -4.90** 
1.  eopp is “end of previous period”, eocp is “end of current period”, MA is “moving average”, nppdi is “non-
property personal disposable income” 
2.  Constructed asset data are not seasonally-adjusted 
3.  For a variable X, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) statistic is the t ratio on π from the regression: ∆Xt = π 
Xt-1 + Σi=1,k θi ∆Xt-i + ψ0 + ψ1 t+ εt,  where k is the number of lags on the dependent variable, ψ0 is a 
constant term, and t is a trend. The kth-order augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic is reported, where k is the last 
significant lag of the 5 lags employed. The trend is included only if significant. For null order I(2), ∆X replaces 
X in the equation above. Critical values are obtained from MacKinnon (1991).  Asterisks * and ** denote 
rejection at 5% and 1% critical values.  
 
 
Table 2: Forecasting equations for real (disposable per capita) non-property income 
 
Dependent variable 










Regressors     
Log(RYN)  -0.82 (10.3)  -0.85 (9.1)  -0.84 (9.8) 
RPRIMA  -0.33 (3.6)  -0.35 (3.1)  -0.34 (3.4) 
∆4 PRIME  -0.40 (3.9)  -0.41 (3.8)  -0.40 (3.7) 
∆8log(CAPUT)  0.30 (4.7)  0.30 (4.7)  0.30 (4.7) 
GSURMA12  0.73 (2.9)  1.3 (3.7)  0.91 (3.0) 
N∆4PRIME  0.036 (2.7)  0.036 (2.7)  0.036 (2.8) 
RLJSER (-1)  0.03 (3.3)  0.03 (2.7)  0.03 (2.9) 
Diagnostics     
s.e  0.015139 0.015437 0.015729 
DW  1.87 1.97 1.83 
1.  Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. 
2.  The equations include an I(2) stochastic trend, where the trend component is specified as 
µt = µt-1  +  βt-1  +  ηt ηt ~  NID(0,σ
2
η ) , 
βt = βt-1  +  ζt   
ζt  ~ NID(0,σ
 2
ζ ) , and we set σ
2
η  = 0    (see Koopman et al, 1995). 
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Regressors       
Intercept  β0  -2.32 (8.0)  -2.41(7.3)  -2.52 (8.9) 
Speed of adjustment  β1  0.297 0.314 0.345 
∆4log(PRIME)  β2  -0.023 (2.8)  -0.036 (3.6)  -0.033 (3.8) 
log(RYN)  β3  0.248 (7.7)  0.258 (5.4)  0.267 (8.5) 
 ∆log(YN)  β4  -0.703 (9.0)  -0.596 (6.1)  -0.654 (8.5) 
log(RHA)  β5  0.138 (8.7)  0.138 (6.0)  0.153 (9.1) 
   And shift with FLIB  β6  -0.250 (3.3)  -  0.299 (3.5) 
log(RPAMA)  β5  0.138 (8.4)  0.138 (8.4)  0.153 (9.1) 
log(RLA)  β7  0.169 (5.8)  0.176 (3.4)  0.192 (6.6) 
   And shift with FLIB   -β6  -0.250 (3.3)  -  -0.299 (3.5) 
∆ log(CAPUT) (-1)  β8  0.49 (2.6)  0.40 (1.8)  0.45 (2.5) 
   And shift with FLIB  β9  -1.36  (2.8)  -  -1.36 (2.5) 
  θ1  0.129  (2.3) - 0.137  (2.2) 
Diagnostics       




  0.740 0.758 0.763 
DW    2.19 2.18 2.32 
LM1    1.13 0.80 3.14 
LM2    3.82 1.65 4.40 
LM3    4.33 6.11 4.91 
LM4    4.79 6.14 5.46 
1.    Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. 
2. Note  that  β1 = -(2β5 + β7 ): t-ratios are not reported for β1 
3.  Critical values (0.05) for LM1 to LM4, respectively, are 3.84, 5.99, 7.82, 9.49.   30 



















Regressors        
Intercept c0  -0.096 (6.4)  -0.114 (5.9)  -0.09 (6.0) 
Seasonal (first quarter up to 1975)  c1  -0.013 (3.3)  -0.010 (2.3)  -0.013 (3.3) 
Speed of adjustment  β  0.625 (9.3)  0.742 (7.9)  0.596 (8.8) 
Weight on current income  λ  0.51 (5.4)  0.57 (4.9)  0.51 (5.1) 
Consumption share of credit-constrained  π0  0.35   0.35   0.35  
Variation of π0 with RPRIMEma   π1  3.5 (1.8)  -  3.8 (1.9) 
Property/non-property income ratio  c2  0.073 (2.4)  0.079 (2.2)  0.079 (2.4) 
 ∆4
 log(RYNMA(+4))
forcst  c6  0.28 (2.1)  0.10 (0.6)  0.30 (2.1) 
RPRIMA   c7  -0.25 (2.6)  -0.17 (1.1)  -0.29 (2.7) 
∆
 log(CAPUT) (-1)  c8  1.06 (3.5)  1.50 (3.5)  1.02 (3.2) 
   And shift with FLIB  β9  -1.36 (2.8)  -  -1.36 (2.5) 
RLADB c3  0.14 (4.8)  0.15 (4.0)  0.13 (4.3) 
RHA c4  0.068 (11.1)  0.066 (10.6)  0.069 (10.4) 
   And shift with FLIB  c5 -  -  - 
RPAMA + RIFA  c4  0.068 (11.1)  0.066 (10.6)  0.069 (10.4) 
Sales tax dummy 1978  c9  0.048 (3.6)  0.043 (3.1)  0.051 (3.6) 
Sales tax dummy 1984  c10  0.052 (3.2)  -  0.053 (3.2) 
Direct FLIB effect  θ2  0.33 - 0.33 
Diagnostics        




 0.770  0.764  0.762 
DW   2.03  2.15  2.00 
LM1   0.03  0.50  0.02 
LM2   3.85  1.14  4.50 
LM3   7.80  6.96  7.79 
LM4   8.27  7.68  7.84 
1.  Absolute values of asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses. 
2.  ∆4
 log (RYNMA(+4))
forcst  defined as the 4-quarter moving average of the 4-quarter ahead income growth 
forecast from Table 2, column 1. 
3.     Critical values (0.05) for LM1 to LM4, respectively, are 3.84, 5.99, 7.82, 9.49. 
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log (household debt/PDNI) log (consumption/PDNI)  32 

























































housing wealth/PDNI directly-held securities/PDNI debt/PDNI
pensions/PDNI liquid assets/PDNI
   33 
Figure 3 : Household debt relative to personal disposable non-property income,  

























































































log (household debt/PDNI) financial liberalization
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Figure 4 : The contribution to the income forecast of the stochastic trend and the 





































weighted dependent variable  stochastic trend weighted interest rate term
 
 
Note 1. The weighted dependent variable term is defined as  ∆4
 log (RYN (+4)) +0.8211 log (RYN) . 
Note 2. The stochastic trend is from the equation in column 1, Table 2. 
Note 3. The weighted composite interest rate term is defined as  -0.327422 *RPRIMEma + 
0.00355294*N∆4PRIME(-1)-0.396631*∆4PRIME(-1) . 
Note 4. The right-hand side variables are shown weighted by their regression coefficients (Table 2, column 1), 
and are levels-adjusted relative to the dependent variable.  
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weighted dependent variable 2 yr change in log(capacity utilis.)
log(real all share JSE index)(-1) government surplus (3 yr moving av) 
 
 
Note 1. The weighted dependent variable term is defined as  ∆4
 log (RYN (+4)) +0.8211 log (RYN). 
Note 2. The right-hand side variables are shown weighted by their regression coefficients (Table 2, column 1), 
and are levels-adjusted relative to the dependent variable.   36 
 Figure 6 : Decomposition of the consumption to personal income ratio into asset to 







































(liquid assets-debt)/PDNI composite illiquid assets/PDNI
real prime interest rate financial liberalization
 
 
Note 1. The right-hand side variables from equation (3.7) are shown weighted by their regression coefficients 
(Table 4, column 1).